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THE PREVENTION OF ELECTRICAL BREAKDOWN
AND ELECTROSTATIC VOLTAGE PROBLEMS
IN THE SPACE SHUTTLE AND ITS PAYLOADS
PART !I: DESIGN GUIDES AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
_0 INTRODUCTION
This part of the report addresses the specific
electrical discharge problems that can directly
affect the Shuttle vehicle and its payloads.
General design Guidelines are provided to assist
flight hardware managers in minimizing these kinds
of problems. Specific data are also included on
workmanshi_ practices and_ most importantly,
system testing while in low-pressure environments.
Finally, certain electrical discharge problems
that may be unique to the design of Shuttle
vehicle itself and to its various mission
operational modes are discussed.
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2.0 DESIGN PROCEDURESFORTHE PREVENTIONOF ELECT_IC__L
2.1 GENEBALDESIGN GUIDES
2.1.1
2.1.1.1
Operating Voltage Levels
Under the proper conditions, corona can occur at
any voltage level. However, there are three
voltage ranges that can be conveniently used to
categorize the different problems and procedures.
These are 0 to 50 volts, 50 to 250 volts, and over
250 volts. The following is derived from Dunbar
(ref. 12) .
Zero to _0 volts peak.- The first voltage range is
50 volts and below. Field stresses normally will
be below 2000 V/ram because the insulation is
normally thicker than 0.025 millimeter. Corona
caused by gaseous ionization will not exist in air
or nitrogen _tmospheres between commonly used
metallic s6rfaces at temperatures below 250 ° C.
In addition, tracking is not expected in this
voltaqe range provided the following qood
workmanship practices are followed durinq design,
packaging, and assembly.
o Avoid contamination on surfaces of
conductors and theil" insulations°
o Select materials and dimensions that can
withstand the worst-case voltage gradients around
the energized conductors.
o Avoid short air qaps between thinly
insulated or bare conductors.
o Select insulatinq materials with _aximum
resistivity and dielectric strength and with low
die lec+. tic constant.
o Apply the Paschen Law curve as modified for
nonuniform fields.
o Bas_ all calculations on the instantaneous
peak "abnormal overvoltaqe" of the system.
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2.1.1.2
o Select materials with _uitable outgassing
properties o
o Select packages with adequate sealing or
venting.
Strict observance of these items will assure that
gaseous breakdown will not occur at temperatures
below 250 ° C.
The type of problems that can be expected if
proper care is not taken are as follows.
o Low-vol+'ge tracking where the extremely
low current (na ,oamperes) will eventually char the
insulation.
o metal migration can occur over extended
operating times. This results in a short circuit
when the metal from one electrode bridges the gap
Set ween electrodes.
o Contamination resulting from salt spray,
outgassinq residues from other spacecraft
equipsent_ structure, and controlled emissions.
o Short circuits resulting from workmanship
(caused by finqerprints and oils that create
localized critical pressures that may affect
nearby high-voltage circuitry).
50 t_o _50 volts peak.- The second voltage r_nge is
between 50 and 250 volts peak. In this range,
besides the pr.eviously stated good workmanship
practices and precautions, the following practices
will minimize the probability that corona will
OCCUI?.
o Eliminate dielectric discontinuity; that
is, avoid a sl]dden increase in voltage stress
between insulators resulting from use of
insulators _ith large difference in dielectric
constant.
o Becess terminals and encapsulate them with
void-free, well-bonded surfaces, and potting
materia Is.
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o Use nontracking insulations.
o Prevent condensations of moisture and other
liquids before and during operation.
o Lengthen flashover Daths when practical
with skirts, qrooves, et cetera.
o Avoid pointed electrodes.
o Provide excellent bonds between conductors
and insulators.
o When hermetic se_linq is requii'ed,
pressurize with a suitable dL'y gas with a high
dielectric strength in a thoroughly dry enclosure.
o Use low dielectric constant insulators.
o Dampen inductive switchinq surqes.
o Design for abnormal fault and transient
voltages.
o Waterproof insulating surfaces.
o Complete coating of critical electrodes may
eliminate electrode-to-electrode breakdown but the
spacing must be sufficient to prevent corona for
dc vo!taqes.
o Avoid multipactor breakdown by having a
high frequency-tlmes-spacing product°
o Arrange conductors so that high- and low-
voltage groups are separated.
o Provide rounded corners on electrical
conductors and ground planes next to energized
circuits.
o Use at least 0.25-millimeter in._ulation
between rounded electrodes and 1.25-_illimeter
insulation between flat surfaces.
Typical problems that can occur in this voltage
range are as follows.
2-3
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o Corona may be enhanced by gases such as
helium, argon, neon, and hydroqen, if they should
six with the pressurizing gas in pressurized
containers during such operations _s leak
aet oct i on.
o Be careful in the use of solvents such as
alcohol, benzene_ et cetera, the outgassing
products of which enhance corona.
o Creepaqe and trackinq can cause increased
temperatures in localized areas and eventually
lead te surface flashover.
o Voltage transients may cause surface
F.lashover to occur. Between 6 and tO f!ashovers
will for_ tracking and eventuallz voltage
breakdown.
Voltaqes over 250 volts_peak.- The third voltage
range is all voltages above 250 volts peak or
those with rf i'._ the su!tipacto_ range. In
_ddition to t_e _ood _orkmanship practices and
precautions sua_ed in sections 5. I. 1.1 and
5.1.1.2, some design features that are recommended
to inhibit corona for voltage above 250 volts are
as follows.
o Avoid mm!tipactor region.
o Eliminate large air gads between insulated
conductors. An example is a twisted pair wires
having an end flare as they enter the terminal
ports. As voltage is increased, corona will first
app&ar at the widest separation in the low-
pressure systems (below 1.33 X 10 -I N/_ z) .
o Application of transverse sagnetic fields
to raise the sparking voltage at pressures below
the critical pressure. Because the effect is to
increase the gap length caused by spiraling of
electrons, breakdown voltage can be lowered,
r_ther than raised, below the critical value of
the parameter, pressure times spacing dimension.
o Avoid the entry of ionized particles o_
electrons into the circuitry from the surrounding
environment. The importance of the presence of
2-_
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such particles is evident from the OSO-I and OSO-
II experiments which used open photonultipliers.
_n? electric field that may extend from openings
in the enclosure _ill attract charged particles of
one polarity. Suitable shielding grids and/or
traps must be provided. Also, hiqh voltage on
conductors in th, vicinity of the openings must be
avoided if possible.
o Voids in encapsulants are especially bad
and should be vented or kept pressurized° When
poorly vented voids or gas enclosures are
encapsulated in an insulation, the gas pocket will
eventually reach critical pressure and electrical
breakdown will occur in the void. In time,
insulation deterioration will occur and the
insulation integrit_ will be destroyed, _esulting
in the loss of equipment.
o The use of semiconducting coatings on high-
voltage surfaces and around stranded wiring can be
used to control uniformity ef fields.
o Use electrode materials that are
conditioned and polished to most effectively
decrease the voltage gradients within the
insul_ tion_
Above 5000 volts, hermetic sealing may be required
for some circuits that must operate at pressures
greater than 7.5 X 10 -4 mm Hq. I_ this case, it
is advisable to use a gas with a high dielectric
strength rather than oil. With oil_ bubbles can
form in zero q, which results in momentary
dielectric breakdown and tracking. Pressurization
is important above 10,000 volts to prohibit
critical pressures caused by slowly outqassing
materials and nearby equipment. Material
compatibility is very important at these very high
voltages.
Typical problems that can occur in this voltage
range are as follows.
o Incomplete bonding of materials.
o Insufficient outgassinq of pottinq
compounds during vacuum impregnation.
2-5
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o Insulation cracking duri_q
thermal/mechanical stressinq.
o Gaseous ionization and partial discharges
_ithin small voids and cracks.
o Creepage and tracking.
o Flashove r.
o Insulation treei,.q on long missions.
2.1.2 Designing for Breakdown Without Damage
Occasional corona discharge or arci.nq often will
not permanently damage the hi_h-voitaqe equipment_
However, it may result in serious interference
with the operation of or even serious damage to
the other equi|_ment in the spacecraft° Examples
have been given of spurious pulses that have
caused randos stepping of commutators in encoding
systems, and of components such as transistors
being burned out by high-voltage spikes. These
pulses can be carried on the low-voltage Dower
distribution lines including the qround re_urns.
The filter cz@acitors on the hiqh-voltage power
supply can store csnsiderable energy that is
released with the occurrence of a sparkover. Only
part of this energy is dissipated as heat in the
spark. The remaining energy is p_opaqated away as
a s;teep wave front or impulse on all neighboring
conductors. _nerg¥ can be transferred to other
circuits either through direct ionic conduction or
by inductive and capacitive coupling.
It is very difficult to completely eliminate
occasional corona discharge or arcing in high-
voltage equipment. Also, there are cases of
inadvertant _'urn-ons that can cause considerable
daaage. This might happen if venting were being
used to produc_ the high dielectric strength of
vacuum and the high-voltage supply _as turned on
near the Paschen minimum by accident. For these
reasons, it is best to design equipment so damage
does not result from corona discharge or arcing.
2-6
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High-voltage power supplies should be designed
with current-limiting characteristics. This way,
no components are overloaded in the event of
corona discharge or arcing. Current-limiting
resistors should be placed between the output
filteL" capacitors and the loads. Also, some power
supplies are designed to limit current at their
output.
The equipment should be packaged in such a way
that all the high-voltage wiring is isolated or
shielded from other circuits to avoid transfer of
energy. One approach is to enclose the enti_e
high-voltage circuit in a conducting envelope with
just a shielded coaxial cable to the circuit it
supplies.
When high- and low-voltage circuits are on the
same printed circuit or terminal board, the common
boundary should be minimized. A qL-ound bus should
be located between high- and low--voltage circuitry
to prevent possible creepaqe currents or arcs. An
example of these design principles is shown in
figure 5-i o Where high-voltage exists on both
sides of the printed circuit or terminal boaud,
the ground bus should be on both sides, preferably
superimposed one _.bove the othe:.
2.1.3 Solde rinq
Proper soldering can reduce the electric field
intensity and thus reduce the chances of corona.
Also, sharp points left by improper solden-ing can
cause tears in the insulation, which, of course,
can lead to insulation breakdown. Some sketches
of acceptable and unacceptable soldered
terminations are shown in figures 5-2 to 5-4.
Standoffs and feedthroughs should be solder-balled
as shown in figure 5-5. This will probably
require a waiver from the NASA solder
specifications. The solder ball is made after the
connection is soldered per the appropriate NASA
specification. Dunbar (ref. 12) states that "The
radius of the solder ball facing the ground plane
should be at least I/6 of the value of the spacing
between the solder ball and ground plane or
2-7
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Figure 2-i.- Common-boundary high- and low-voltage circuits.
7 Terminat.ion
_/r'-- Solder (smooth surface) ,
Figure 2-2.- Acceptable soldered termination.
Termination/
A, /" Solder
i
__, f T- Circuit board
'----Termination _x, Soldc-r draw
Figtlre 2-3.- Unacceptable soldered terminations.
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SOLDER BALL
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k'<---TERMINALS
Figure 2-4.- Acceptable components interconnection.
COMPONENT
SOLDER BALL
LEAD
/ STANDOFF
Figure 2-5.- Acceptable standoff connection.
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adjacent high voltage circuit. This low ratio
decreases the voltage gradient at the surface of
the solder ball and decreases the probability of
corona. When large spacings are involved the
solder ball should have at least 3.1 millimeters
(0.125 inch) diameter. These solder balls must be
properly secured to eliminate any dynamic
vibration and acoustic problems."
2.1._ Testing Philosophy
Proper design of electronic equipment is essential
for corona-free operation. However, it is not
sufficient. Testing is a must. From the
standpoint of corona detection, many test plans
are inadequate (ref. 39). Indeed, some test plans
seem to take no notice of the possibility of
corona. These plans do not address the need to
prove that instrument function is free from corona
degradation. In many cases, there is not even any
corona-detection equipment used. The experiment
equipment itself is regarded as the corona
detector. This meets with varying degrees of
success. The power supplies may be heavily
filtered and any effects of corona within the
power supply would be masked, if the output of
the experiment is in digital furm, corona would
again be masked.
Many experiments are operated only intermittently
in thermal vacuum tests for relatively brief
periods. Yet, corona onset may only occur after
days into a test. The pressure and temperature
time profiles _sually are chosen for factors other
than corona detection. _ost acceptance thermal
vacuum tests are entirely too short to reveal
latent corona problems. Qualification test
profiles are better, but in some cases do not
follow mission profiles. Unfortunately, mission-
length acceptance testing is usually a departure
from normal procedure. However, no better way is
known to qain confidence that a given unit will
not experience corona-J nduced malfunctions.
The testing of prototype, qualification, and
flight equipment should be differentiated.
Dunbar's philosophy is quoted as follows.
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"Testing and Detection - Generally, the test
philosophy for electronic parts and hardware
should be that flight Darts and engineering,
development, prototype and qualification equipment
may and should be thoroughly and extensively
tested and stressed repeatedly to establish the
applicability and design margin of the design.
Qualification equipment should first be tested to
acceptance levels to verify workmanship and to
identify infant mortality reasons for failure.
Flight equipment should never be stress tested or
be electrically tested repeatedly. One test of
flight equipment will verify workmanship and
expose infant mortality conditions. Electrical
stress, a cumulative condition, can jeopardize the
imposed operatinq life of a flight device."
2.1.5 Design Review Checklist
A checklist can be quite helpful in the reviewinq
of a design. Smith and Aptaker (ref. _0) have
published a very extensive list of questions
relating t¢ aerospace systems. The following was
compiled by Paul and Burrowbridqe (ref. 2). it
includes only those questio_is relating to
electrical breakdown that are omitted from the
literature or that require special emphasis.
"I. Are any hollow core resistors used?
"2. If hollow core resistors are used, are
they adequately sealed or vented to avoid internal
glow discharge?
"3. Are any solid state circl]it elements so
located that voltage gradients (electric fields)
of sufficient maqnitude to damage them can be
imposed in either normal or faulty operation?
,,i_. Are solid state circuit elements protected
against damage from excess reverse current in the
case of an electrical breakdown?
"5. In transformers, chokes, and tuning coils,
is the voltage between turns safely below the
breakdown threshold?
2-11
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"6. In transformers, chokes, and coils, is
insulation adequate to preve_t electrical
breakdown in the critical pressure region?
"7. In transformers, are current limitinq
design featurss adequate to prevent loss of
function resulting fEom an electrical breakdown?
"S. In connectors and pluqs_ if used, is
adequate venting provided?
"9. In connectors and plugs, if used, are the
insu!atinq materials chosen for low s_Isceptibility
to tracking and treeing?
" 10. Is the use of connectors and plugs in the
high voltage side confined to the minisum number
compatible with the intended application?
"!I. Are large potential gradients possible
between exposed adjacent connections ou printed
circuit boards?
"12. Does the design guard against transients
large enough to initiate breakdown in both "make"
and "break" operations?
"13. Are bleeder resistances incorporated with
all capacitors that could store enough energy to
cause breakdown?
"I_o Are current limiting features of all
circuits adequate to prevent both self-damage and
neighbor-damage in the event of electrical
breakdown?
"15. Are test points readily accessible for
corona detection tests?
"16. Can every conceivable electrical
breakdown fault be detected by tests?
"17. Will catastrophic failure result if test
points are grounded?
"1_. Is cablin_ insulation adequate for planned
operations and for operation through the critical
pressure region?
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"19. Is cabling properly arranqed to avoid
trapping of gas?
"20. Are sharp points and sharp edges
completely avoided?
"21. Are arc suppression features for both make
and break adequate?
"22. Are appropriate steps taken to avoid the
existence of ions in regions of large potential
qradients?
'_23. Are potting and coating materials chosen
so that mechanical stress on parts is kept small?
"2_. Are the possible effects of aging of
potting and coating materials provided for?
"25. _re both individual and combined effects
of environmental factors such as temperature,
vacuum, penetratinq radiation, ions, and
outqassinq taken into account in the design?
"26. Are provisions made to prevent inadvertent
turnon of high voltage?
"27. Has electrical stress analysis been done
on all circuits for both normal and breakdown
operation? "
2.2 POSSIBLE ELECTRICAL BRE&KDOWN PROBLEMS WITH THE
SPACE SHUTTLE
2.2.1 Possible Exposed Electronic Systems
Hypersonic and reentry vehicles usually use
instrumentation wire to transmit small voltage
signals from sensors measurinq temperature,
vibration, and strain. These siqnals may be
recorded, telemetered, or displayed for pilot
information. It is important, even critical, that
the wires transmit these siqnals with a minimum
additional error. This is especially important
where the vehicle safety depends upon the signal
inteqrity. If there are such sensors on the
2-_13
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Shuttle, they will be exposed to extreme
environmental conditions, probably temperatures
over 1000 ° F. These extreme conditions can be
expected to cause some signal error to be
generated within the instrumentation wire.
The other area of concern would be the electronic
bays G, 5, and 6 located in the aft section of the
orbiter (fig. 5_6). The electroaics contained in
these bays is shown in figures 5-7 to 5-9,
E_spectivelyo The identification numbers and
letters for the units are given in table 5-I. The
dc power levels (ref. 7) are 28 _ dc nominal with
2r_- to 3_-volt steady-state limits. The main ac
power in bOO hertz, 115/200-volt, three-phase,
four-wire, wye-connected o
2.2.2 Possible Problems During Launch
Because the voltages of concern (28 V dc and 115
ac) are well below the Paschen minimum for air, it
would seem that no voltage problems would exist.
However, experience has shown that even 28 V dc
can break down under the right conditions. In
fact, Vance and Chown (ref. 41) have produced arc
discharges in the laboratory at 28 V dc in a
plasma environment. The plasma environment is
produced in spacecraft by either arc discharge or
the rocket exhaust.
The Agena Program was plagued for many years by an
occasional short circuit occurring at or near the
time of separation from the booster (ref. 42).
All these short circuits involved very large
current flows. Some of these currents stopped as
mysteriously as they started. Others have even
burnt out circuitry so that the completion of the
•mission was impeded or even prevented. Some of
the breakdowns were identified as happening in the
28-volt, _00-hertz regulators and pyro-power
supplies. The breakdowns occurred at separation
from the booster. The plasma environment was
believed to be produced by the retrorockets that
were used to decelerate the booster after staging
from the _gena.
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SC.
TABLE 2-I.- EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS AND
ABBREVIATIONS FOR ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT
[Taken from SD7_-SH-0120-06-1, March 15, 1974]
number uniquely identifying the following interface
unit types_
01:
02:
03:
04:
O5:
O6:
07:
08:
09 :
10:
11:
12:
13:
1_:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
General Purpose Computer (GPC)
Mass Memory (_M)
DisDlay Elect_onics U_it (DEU)
MultiDlex/Demultiplex FF (MDM FF)
Multiplex/Demultiplex FA (MDM FA)
Multip!ex/Demultiplex LF (_DM LF)
_ultiplex/Demuitiplex LA (MDM LA)
Multiplex/Demultiplex PF (_DM PF)
Display Driver Unit (DDU)
Forward Events Controller (FEC)
Afi Events Controller (AEC)
EnGine Interlace Units (EIU)
PCM Master Unit (PC_)
Manipulator Controller Interface Unit (MCiU)
Performance Monitor Annunciator Panel (PMAP)
Multiplex/Demultiplex OT (MDM OT)
Multiplex/Demultiplex OF (_D_ OF)
Multiplex/Demultiplex OA (MDM OA)
Multiplex/Demultiplex LL (MD_ LL)
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TABLE 2-1.- EQOIPMENTIDENTIFICATION NUMBERS AND
ABBREVIATIONS FOR ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT - Continued
SD_
SE.
SF.
SG.
20: Sultiplex/D.multiDlex LR (MD_ LR)
of the interfac_ unit type corresponding to the inte_-
face _uit type identification numhez shown in SC.
/_elIAcs__Un___um__bei_R__IX_. A twc-diqit number
desiqnatinq a particular unit of a common interfa.ce
unit type.
E_S@l__Z_n___I_d_t_i_a_i__n_____m/L_r. A four-digit number
l_iqueI7 ideuti_yinq the foilo_inq equipment.
._iRm_n___@_!_den_i_c_____mj_. A four-digit number
uniquely identifyinq the following equipment types.
100,,
101 .
102.
103.
10_.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110,,
111.
112.
113.
General Purpose Computer (GPC)
Input Output Processor (IOP)
Mass _emor7 (MM)
Display Electronics Unit (DEU)
Multiplezer/Desultiplexer FF (MDM FF)
Multiplexer/Demultiplexer F& (MD_ Fi)
_ultiplexer/Demultiplexer 12 (MDM LF)
Multiplexer/Demultiplexer LA (MDS LA)
Multiplexer/Demultiplexer PF (MDM PF)
Display Driver Unit (DDU}
Forward Master Events Controller (MEC EF)
Aft _aster Events Controller (_EC EA)
PC_ Master Unit (PCM)
Manipulator Controller Interface Unit (MCIU}
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TABLE 2-I.- EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS AND
ABBREVIATION3 _ FOR ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT -- Continued
11_.
115.
116.
!17.
1i8.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
12_.
125.
126.
127.
128.
12g.
130.
131.
132.
133.
Performance Monitor Annunicator Panel (PMAP)
Multiplexer/DemultiDlexer OT (_DM OT)
Multiplexer/Demultiplexer OF (MDM OF}
Multip!exer/Demult_Dlexer OA (_IDM OA)
Mu!tiplexe[/Demultiulexer LL (MDM LL)
Mu!tiplexer/Demultiplexer LR (MDM LR)
Air Data Transducer Assembly (ADT)
-nertial Measurement Unit (I[_U}
Startracker Unit (STU}
TACAN Receiver/Transmitter (TAC)
Radar Altimeter (RDA)
Microwave Scan Beam Landinq System Receive_
Transmitter (MLS)
Master Timinq Unit (MTU)
Network Siqnal Processor (NSP)
Controller Altitude Director Electronics
(CAt)
Rotation Translation Control Electronics
(RTC)
Normal Lateral Accelerometer (NLA)
Reaction Jet Driver Forward (RJDF)
rendezvous Radar Electronics (RRE)
Load Control Assembly Forward (LCF)
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TABLE 2-I.- EQUIPMENTIDENTIFICATION NUMBERSAND
_BBREV!ATIONS FOE ELECTRONICSEQUIPMENT- Continued
13_.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
1"40.
1/41.
1/42.
143.
1/44.
1/45.
1/46.
1/47.
1/48.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
Load Control Assembly Aft (LCA)
Brake Skid Controller (BSC)
T_CAM Control Panel (TCP)
Speed Brake Hand Controller (SBHC)
Hotation Hand Controller (RHC)
Translation Hand Controller (THC)
Attitude Director Indicato_ (ADI)
AIDha _ach indicator (AaI)
_aster Thrust Controller (_TC)
Altitude/Vertical Velocity Indicator (AgVI)
Horizontal Situatio_ Indicator (HSI)
Total Air Temperature Indicator (TAT)
Enqine Interface Unit (EIU)
Rudder Pedal Transduce_ _sse_bly (RPTA)
Anqular Accelerometer (AA)
Ascent Thrust Vector Controller (ATVC)
Aerosurface Servo Amplifier (ASh)
Orbiter Rate Gyro Assembly (RGO)
Left Hand SRB Rate Gyro Assemblv (RGL)
Riqht Hand SRL Rate Gyro Assembly (RGR)
Reaction Jet/OMS Driver (RJOD)
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TABLE 2-I.- EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS AND
_BBREVIATIONS FOR ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT - Continued
156,.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
16t4.
165.
166.
167o
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
17_.
175.
176.
177.
Alpha-Temperature Probe Assembly (ATP}
Pressure-Static Probe Assembly (PSP)
Heater-Motor Controller (HMC)
Battery (BAT)
Fuel Cell (FC)
Electrical Power System (EPS)
RCS Forward Module (RMF)
RCS Aft Riqht Module (RMR)
RC$ Aft Left Module (RML)
RCS Enqine Dool Left (REDL)
RCS Enqine Door Riqht (REDR)
Main Gear Left (MGL)
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TABLE 2-I,- EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS AND
ABBREVIATIONS FOR ZLECTRONICS E_UIP_ENT - Continued
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
18t$.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
200.
210.
220.
230.
231.
232.
2_0.
250.
Main Gear Right (MGR)
Nose Wheel (NW}
Main Engir_e Controlle_ (MEC)
_ain Propulsion System (MPS)
Zxternal Tank (ET)
Thermal Protection System (TPS)
Orbital Maneuverinq System (OMS)
Payload Bay Door Forward (PLBDF)
Solid Rocket Booster (S£B)
Hvd[aulic System (HYD)
Launch Umbilical Door ,_LUD)
External T_nk Door (ETD)
Deceleration Chute Door (DCD)
Liquid Hydrogen Tank (LH2 TK)
2-2_
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TABLE 2-I.- EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION _UMBERS AND
ABBREVIATIONS FOR ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT - Concluded
251 .
252
253.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
Liq_]id Oxyqen Tank (LOX TK}
External Tank Main Bus (EL BUS)
Gas Detector (GAS DE)
Network Siqnal Processor (NSP)
Payload Siqnal Processor (PSP)
EVA Siqnal Processor (ESP)
Doppler Extractor (DE)
S-Band Antenna Switch Assembly (SAS)
Eg_uiRm_en___e Abb_eviai_n . The abbreviation of the
equipment type correspondinq to the equipment type
identification number shown in SG.
E__uipment Number_o_._TffDe. A two-diqit number desiq-
natinq a particular unit of a common equipment type.
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Goudy (ref. 43) has found that separation of a
connector carrying a large amount of current (20
to 24 arabs) can cause secondary arcinq. The
initial arcing occurs Irom the female to the male
pin when the connector is separated. The ionized
gas remaining at the face of the connector then
initiates an arc or flashover from female to
female pin.
In the Apollo 7 mission (ref. 18), the crew
reported two ac bus I failure indications and one
ac bus I and 2 failure indication. Postflight
tests indicated that the cause was associated with
corona arcing of the ac rower within a motor-
operated cryogenic fan switch located in the
service module. _ leak in the environmental seal
caused the pressure to drop to the threshold for
corona arcing when the controls were opened to
turn off fan power.
Some of the anomalies in launches of the Titan
IIi-C rocket were felt to be due to rocket-exhaust
initiation of conduction in connectors (ref. 44).
These anomalies are of especial interest because
both the Titan Iii-C and the Shuttle have two
solid rocket motors (SR_) for booste_cs, and the
altitude for SRM separation is about the sa_e for
both vehicles ( 25 miles). Thus, anomalies
associated with staging for the Titan III-C may
give indications of possible problems for the
Shuttle. When the SRM's are jettisoned, two
rockets (exhausts directed toward the Titan !
stage) are activated to move the solid, strap-on
rockets away from the main vehicle. The operation
of the jettison rockets bathes the Titan vehicle
in exhaust products. The sensors that gave
indication that this occurs were located (ref. 29)
on the hop of the rocket, this woul_ indicate
that the entire rocket would be covered with
rocket exhaust. Thus, if the Space Shuttle uses
retrorockets to jettison the SRM's, any open
connectors or circuits would be bathed in rocket
exhaust. Whether this exhaust plasma would reach
the electronics in bays _, 5, and 6 depends on
many factors. If it is possible for the plasma to
enter through the bay doors and reach the
electronics, then all circuits should be protected
by suitable potting materials.
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2.2.3 P_._sible Problems in Orbit
One possibility is the production of an unsuitable
atmosphere for the electronics by degassing of
surfaces and organic solids. This should be
c hec ked.
2.2.4 Possible Problems During Reentr7
The vehicle's safety during reentry depends upon
signal integrity. A _alse bit of data or
information fed to tile guidance computer could
lead to serious results.
If there are sensors for measuring temperature,
vibration, and strain, then they will probably be
exposed to extreme environmental conditions° in
the design of the B-2707, it was estimated (ref.
19) that instrumentation wire up to 20 feet in
length would be exposed to temperatures up to
1800 ° F from aerodynamic heating. This can be
expected to cause some signal error to be
generated within the instrumentation wire_ but
this error can be minimized by using high-
insulation-resistance and low-resistance°conductor
wires. Because the Shuttle is expected to
generate these very hiqh temperatures upon
reentry, similar considerations would apply. The
type of wire needed for temperatures over 1000 ° C
is discussed in section 3.4.7.3. Also discussed
are the effects of high temperature on insulation.
The next question is: How hot will it be for the
electronics in bays 4, 5, and 6? If there are no
plans for cooling the bay, then the temperature
could become quite high. At high temperatures
(above 500 ° F), rapid deterioration of the
insulation sets in as described in section
3.4.7.3. When this happens, corona will set in.
Besides accelerating the degradation of the
insulation, the corona could generate false bits
of data for the computer. Eventually total
voltage breakdown would occur. The false bits of
data could possibly be screened out by clever
software, hut total voltage breakdown would be
disastrous.
2-27
............. II I I I I Ill I I Ir
-- i i I i
To predict the possibility of corona in bays 4, 5,
and 6, a reasonable estimate must be made of the
temperature and the type of atmosphere to be
expected upon reentr7. Ths existence of
contaminants (section 3._.7._) and plasma could be
crucial. If the environment is severe, then
proper encapsulation procedures must be taken.
2.3 POSSIBLE ELECTRICAL BREAKDOWN PROBLEMS WITH
SHUTTLE PAYLOADS
Almost all electrical discharge problems for the
DaTloads can be avoided by following the
instructions in section 5.1 and other parts of
this manual.
For experiments that are to be operated in a
"shirt-sleeve" atmosphere aboard the orbiter,
pressurization of the high-voltage container might
be an answer to corona problems, with the right
choice of gas and pressure, the voltages
obtainable could be well above the COV of air at
sea-level _ressure. Also monitoring and
stabilization of the gas pressure would be
comparativ ely simple.
However, oil-filled containers are not
recommended. Bubbles can form in oil at zero g.
These bubbles can then cause momentar7 dielectric
breakdown and tracking.
Every space vehicle has an atmosphere of ions.
Th_s, a hard vacuum never exists close to a
spacecraft. For this reason, ventin_ is not
recommended as a procedure when the experiement is
to be conducted near the orbiter. If the
experiment is delivered to orbit and then left,
however, then venting could be considered.
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3.0 PO__SI_L_E LECTROSTATICVOLTAGE PROBLEMS _ITH _THE
_2__CE SHUTTLE
POSSIBLE PROBLEMS DURING LAUNCH
3.1.1 Electrostatic Charging of the Thermal Protection
System
The orbiter will have a thermal protection system
(TPS) using tile as an outer heatshield. Because
these tiles are nonconductive, a large amount of
electrostatic charge can build up on thes. A
rocket with a metal skin is effectively kept
discharged above 4000 feet by the rocket plume
(section _.5). This occurs even in the presence
of precipitation charging.
However, if the orbiter were to encounter
precipitation charging, the tiles would not be
discharged by the rocket plume and they could
build up a potential of hundreds of thousands of
volts. Just how large this potential would be is
hard to estimate.
The Boeing 707 built up a voltage of over 300,000
volts in an encounter with precipitation
containing ice (section _.5). The electrostatic
voltage on an airplane is limited to the potential
at which corona takes place (unless the charging
rate is higher than the discharging rate). This
potential is determined by the altitude and the
radius of curvature of the discharging point. On
an airplane, there are numerous places (edge of
the wing, etc.) where the radius of curvature is
small. This keeps the potential on the airplane
from becoming too large. On the orbiter, however,
ea_c_h tile will have to discharge separately.
Because this would be a discharge from a plane
surface (essentially infinite radius of
curvature), the corona potential could conceivably
be millions of volts.
The charge will accumulate on the surface until
the potential qradient along the surface is large
enough to support a streamer discharge over the
tile surface to a metal structure nearby, or until
3-I
the dielectric strength of the insulator is
exceeded and the charge is relieved by a spark
discharge that punctures the dielectric and
t_avels to an underlying conductor_ Thick
dielectric surfaces, such as the tiles, backed by
met_l are particularly susceptible to energetic
streamer discharges because the thick dielectric
can support very high voltages and the metal
backing increases the effective capacitance of the
surface. Streamer discharges, like spark
discharges, seek the easiest path to the vehicle
structure.
ThL]s_ at bes± it would seem that the tiles would
cause very energetic streamers that would
interfere with guidance computers and
communication equipment; and at worst the tiles
themselves would be destroyed.
The Shuttle is being designed as a reusable
vehicle. Thus, the design parameters for the
tiles are for the tile to withstand a temperature
of up to 1500 ° F without any appreciable change of
physical structure. The electrical conducti'_ity
is not ezpected to change m_ch after reentry.
Because of the extreme heat of reentry, there may
be no electrostatic discharge problem during the
reentry phase, and thus the problem may exist only
during the launch.
Many different conductive coatings have been
developed to cover dielectric surfaces on
airplanes (e.g., L'ef_ 36). The tiles could be
coated with one of these conductive coatings.
This would prevent the streamer discharge during
launch.
Even if the streamer discharges are stopped by the
improved conductivity of the tiles, there will
probably still be corona discharge. The tiles
will still probably not be discharged by the
rocket plume but will have to discharge in the
same way as an air_lane. If this turns out to be
the case, then it would seem worthwhile to
investigate the use of dischargers. These
dischargers would have to be _etractable because
they would otherwise be burnt off during reentry.
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Without the dischargers, the corona bursts may be
energetic enough to interfere seriously with the
guidance computer and with communications.
3.1.2
3.1.2.1
3.1.2.2
Electrostatic Charging of the Windshield
The windshield structure is shown in figure 6-I.
Each pane is about 35 to 37 inches in diagonal
measurement. The size is comparable to the 7_7
windshield. The outboard pane takes the thermal
load and the inboard pane, the pressure load. The
redundant pane is made of thick (compared with
outboard pane) fused silica so that it can pick up
the pressure load if the inboard pane breaks
and/or the thermal load if the outboard pane
breaks.
P unc_ure__o_le_ms_- The orbiter windshield does
not have a deicer, it is felt that because of its
unigue fliqht plan there will be no condensation
on the windshields. During launch, the air
leaking out will be warmer than the ambient. In
orbit, the slow leakage will not cause
condensation. The windshield is expected to be
hot up to an hour after landing, so no
condensation is expected during reentry or
landing.
The absence of a deicer almost eliminates the
possibility of puncture. When the windshield
discharges, it will almost certainly do so to the
air frame.
Vi9ibility and rf noise problems.- Because the
windshield is a nonconductor, there will almost
certainly be streamer effects during the launch
period. These streamers will probably be fairly
energetic and could cause some visibility problems
and almost certainly will Cause some rf noise
problems. If this rf noise is coupled into the
data-transmission lines or the communications, the
results could be serious. With airplanes, a
transparent conductive coating is put onto the
windshield to increase the conductivity. Any
coating on the windshield of the orbiter, however,
would be burned off during reentry.
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However, there may be no streamer discharge
problem from the windshield during reentry because
of the extreme heat. If this were the case and
protection against streamers were a problem only
during the launch phase, then a coating could be
applied before each launch. Of course, the
coating should be chosen to obviate deleterious
effects as a result of its burning off during
reentry.
3.1.3 Pyrotechnic Devices
T_ _ pre_lature firing of a pyrotechnic device could
b_ disastrous. As discussed in section _._, these
-as can be set off by an electrostatic
discharge. It would seem to be prudent to examine
the relevant devices on the Space Shuttle as was
done for the _pollo spacecraft (ref. 38)
3.2 POSSIBLE PROBLEMS IN ORBIT
3.2.1 Electrostatics and Contaminant Behavior
At one time it was felt that, if there was an
electrostatic voltage difference between two
separate orbiting vehicles, there could be a
problem when they docked. It was felt that a
spark could jump from one vessel to the othe_ to
equ;lize the potentials just before docking.
However, every spacecraft has an atmosphere of its
own and, when the atmospheres of the craft make
contact, the voltages balance in a civilized
exchange of charge.
This very atmosphere, which prevents a harmful
electrostatic discharge, tends to degrade many
experiments; for exaatple, collection of ions on
the lens of a telescope. Electrostatic charge
plays a very important role in this contamination.
study should be made of the effect of
electrostatic charge on contaminant behavior for
the Shuttle and its payloads. A similar study was
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made by Beaver and Ellison (ref. _5) for the
Sky !a b.
3.2.2 Electros_tic Potential of Satellites
Because of photoemission and other processes,
satellites will acquire an electrostatic
potential. This potential can seriously interfere
with the satel!ite's function. Some satellite
potentials (ref. _6) are given in table 6-I. One
satellite, _TS-5, has charged up to the amazing
potential of -12,000 volts in eclipse and several
hundred volts in sunlight (ref. 47).
3_2.3 Biological Shock
There are many sources of possible biological
shock in a spacecraft. Many materials are
insulators and, when two insulators rub together,
there is usually a separation of charge that, o£
course, produces an electrostatic potential. The
discharge of this potential can have serious
consequences. Ignition of solid combustibles and
interference with biomedical sensors are two
dangers. Other hazardous effects would be
interference with communications or telemetered
data and the involuntary reflex movements
associated with discharge of a spa_k from a body.
Potter and Bake_ (ref. #8) investigated possible
electrostatic discharges in the Apollo and Skylab
spacecraft. Among other things, they found that
the lockers would accumulate charge and that the
lithium hydroxide canisters in the command module
acquired a large electrostatic voltage (above
_0,000 volts) when removed from the storage
lockers. The latter item is mentioned because the
canisters are expected to be present on the Space
Shuttle. The space suits were also producers of
large electrostatic discharges.
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343 POSSIBLE PROBLEMS DURING REENTRY
3.3.1 Upper Atmosphere
The orbiter is e_pected to heat up in excess of
1000 ° F. This very high temperature and the
plasma created b_" it will probably sweep all
charges off the outside of the orbiter. Thus,
there would seem to be no problem with
electrostatic discharge in the upper atmosphere.
3.3.2 Lower _ tmosphere
as the orbiter begins to slow and cool, there
might be a period before landing where
electrostatic discharge could again be serious.
The voltage buildup may not be as serious as
during the launch period because of the elevated
temperatures, but the electrostatic voltage could
get high enough to be troublesome.. Retractable
dischargers that could be extended in the lower
atmosphere may be of some help.
The windshield could also cause problems if it
becomes cool enough to hold a charge. Streamers
from it could interlere with the guidance computer
at a very critical time.
_easurements of charging versus temperature and of
temperature versus time should be made on the
windshield and on the tiles. Peaiistic estimates
cf potential dangers could then be made.
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